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 Introduction
In recent years there has been considerable debate over
e privatization of the education sector in low and middle
come countries where private education has fast
panded. Several international organizations have been
volved in this expansion with the International Financial
rporation (IFC) being the largest multilateral investor: as
 January 2011 the IFC provided $523 million in ﬁnancing
 68 private education projects in 33 developing countries
r a total value of $1.8 billion.1 Proponents of privatization
gue that the private sector can be used as a means of
increasing access to education via efﬁcient supply:
attending a private school has been associated with better
test score results, increased school attainment and higher
wages (e.g. Riddell, 1993). In high income countries, an
extensive literature has estimated the effect of attending
private schools on education and wages using a number of
identiﬁcation strategies to control for selection bias. Brown
and Belﬁeld (2001) review the studies for the US and the
UK and report wage returns to private schools ranging
between 7% and 10% for the UK and between 10% and 23%
for the US, depending on the level of education and on the
sample considered.
On the contrary, the evidence for low and middle
income countries remains mainly descriptive. Largely due
to data limitations, most studies simply compare differ-
ences in mean wages and school attainment between
private and public schools’ students without controlling
for self-selection into the school of choice (e.g. Chudgar &
Quin, 2012 for India; Asadullah, 2009 for Bangladesh and
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A B S T R A C T
Despite the rapid expansion and increasing importance of private education in developing
countries, little is known on the impact of studying in private schools on education and
wages. This paper contributes to ﬁlling this gap by estimating the returns to private high
schools in Mexico. We construct a unique data set that combines labour market outcomes
and historical census data, and we exploit changes in the availability and size of public and
private high schools across states and over time for identiﬁcation. We ﬁnd that attending a
private high school does not affect school progression to college nor high school wages but
it does positively affect wages conditional on college completion. Results are robust to a
number of robustness tests on the validity of the instruments.
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donesia). A noticeable exception is the paper by Bravo,
ukhopadhyay, and Todd (2008), which uses data from a
chool voucher program introduced in Chile in 1980 to
entify a dynamic structural model of private school
ttendance and wages. The authors ﬁnd that the voucher
rogram increased enrolment in private subsidized
chools, which subsequently had a positive signiﬁcant
ffect on labour force participation and wages.2
Thus, despite the important related policy implications,
ttle is known on the relative efﬁciency of private and
ublic schools in improving educational attainment and
ages in low and middle income countries. This paper
ontributes to ﬁlling this gap by estimating the returns to
rivate high schools in Mexico. We construct a unique
ataset that combines individual-level data on school
hoices and wages with state-level school census data
ince the late 1980s. We ﬁrst describe the evolution in the
vailability and size of public and private high schools
cross states in Mexico during the 1990s, and we show that
e public high school sector expanded much faster than
e private sector. We then exploit these changes in
elative availability and size of public relative to private
igh schools to identify the effect of studying in a private
igh school on school attainment and on wages. More
peciﬁcally, we instrument the choice of attending a
rivate high school with measures of the relative
vailability and relative size of public high schools in
e state and year when the high school choice was made
r a sample of workers aged 23–35 in 2008.
We ﬁnd that attending a private high school does not
ffect school progression from high school to college nor
ages after high school, while it does increase wages upon
ollege completion. These results are robust to a number
f validity checks on the strength and exogeneity of the
struments, including controlling for measures of edu-
ation quality and other omitted factors that may affect
oth school choice and wages, potential demand-driven
hanges in high schools’ availability, and between-state
igration. Even if this evidence is reassuring, we apply the
ethod recently developed by Nevo and Rosen (2008) to
rther assess the robustness of our ﬁndings to weaker
entiﬁcation assumptions. In particular, we explicitly
llow the instruments to be correlated with the error term
 the outcome equation and estimate bounds of the
eturns to private high schools. When we relax the
ssumption that the instruments are exogenous, we ﬁnd
hat the returns range between 8% and 58%. This range of
stimates is too wide to be informative on the point
stimate of the returns. However, the lowest point
stimate of 8% is higher than the OLS returns, estimated
t 5%, which, alongside the other checks on the validity of
he instruments, suggests that there are robust positive
wage returns to private high school for those that
complete college education.
This paper contributes to the existing literature by
establishing a positive causal relationship between at-
tending a private high school and wages in a middle
income country. Two main limitations are worth bearing in
mind when interpreting the ﬁndings. First, we are unable
to estimate the exact magnitude of the wage returns
because our estimates are likely to partly capture the
impact of unobserved factors, such as peer effects and
family background variables, which we cannot control for
with the available data. Second, our estimates must be
thought of as the short-term returns to private high school
after college graduation since we work with a sample of
young workers. Returns to private high school could
reduce in the long-run if, over time, job experience
becomes a more important determinant of earnings than
the type of school attended.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 describes the private and public high school
sectors in Mexico and their evolution between 1970 and
2000. Section 3 outlines the empirical framework. Section 4
describes the data and presents summary statistics. In
Section 5 we present the main results, and in Section 6 we
discuss the validity of the instruments. Section 7 concludes.
2. Public and private high schools in Mexico
The Mexican education system is one of the largest in
Latin America covering 33.3 million students in 2008, or
31.5% of the country’s population (SEP, 2008a, 2008b).
There are twelve years of formal education prior to college:
six years of primary, three years of secondary, and two or
three years of high school. Three main types of high school
education are offered: (i) bachillerato general, which leads
students on an academic track in preparation for college;
(ii) bachillerato tecnolo´gico, which has a more technical
focus and prepares students for either vocational work or
higher education to become qualiﬁed technicians in
speciﬁc areas; and (iii) profesional te´cnico, which is a
two-year program designed for students seeking a more
technical or vocational training that does not allow
continuation onto college.
High school education is offered by a mixture of public
and private institutions.3 Enrolment in both public and
private high schools is generally open up to capacity and
only in the event of excess demand schools administer an
entrance exam.4 However, there are monetary barriers to
entrance, especially in the private sector where schools are
primarily ﬁnanced via tuition fees. Public high schools are
free of charge and fully funded by the federal, state, or
municipal governments. Even then, students are often
2 Also for Chile, Anand, Mizala, and Repetto (2009) ﬁnd no difference
etween the academic achievement of students in the fee-charging
rivate voucher treatment group relative to their counterparts in free
rivate voucher schools, while they ﬁnd that students in fee-charging
3 Private schools are legally established after having obtained a license
granted by the federal or state government, the Reconocimiento de Validez
Oﬁcial (RVOE), which guarantees that basic standards are met. Once RVOE
has been granted, there is no further regulation as to the quality or type of
academic programs offered by private institutions.
4 An exception are public high schools in the metropolitan area ofrivate voucher schools have higher scores than students in public
hools.
Mexico City, which recruit students through public competition (http://
www.comipems.org.mx).
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C. Binelli, M. Rubio-Codina / Economics of Education Review 36 (2013) 198–215200couraged to give a voluntary contribution, of varying
ount depending on school needs, the poverty level of
e area and the administrative authority. In addition,
dents in both private and public high schools have to
ver exam fees, schooling materials, transport and other
ing costs. Using data from the Mexican National
nsumption and Expenditure Survey (Encuesta Nacional
 Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares or ENIGH) for 2002, we
timate that the average direct costs of studying (fees,
oks, exams, etc.) in a public high school represents about
% of median yearly household income, whereas the
erage direct cost of attending a private high school
ounts to approximately 23%.
A limited number of scholarships help students meet
ese costs. They are mainly offered in the context of
ortunidades, the largest anti-poverty program in the
untry, which provides cash transfers to poor families
nditional on primary, secondary and, starting in 2001,
gh school attendance. Since 2003, Jo´venes con Oportuni-
des, additionally provides monetary incentives to
mplete high school.5 Student loans are also limited in
ope and coverage and only ﬁnance college education.6
In 2008 the enrolment rate at high school was 61%, of
hich about 19% was in private schools. Of those enroled,
% were enroled in bachillerato general (25% in private
hools), 29% in bachillerato tecnolo´gico (11% in private
hools) and 10% in profesional te´cnico (17% in private
hools) (SEP, 2008a, 2008b and own calculations).
. Trends in the provision of high school education
We next document the evolution in the provision of high
hool education by the public and the private sector using
ta from the Mexican School Census (Censo Escolar or
tadı´stica 911), which is collected yearly by the Secretariat
 Public Education (Secretarı´a de Educacio´n Pu´blica or SEP).
e school census contains the number of schools, teachers,
dents and classes for each of the 32 Mexican states by
ucation level and by type of school (public/private). We
ve combined paper records from 1970 to 1989 and online
cords since 19907 to construct a dataset with the number
 schools, teachers, students and classes by year and by
te in private and public high schools from 1970 to 2000.
s. 1–3 plot average trends in the number of schools and
dents by sector over this period.
As shown in Fig. 1, the public sector has expanded faster
an the private sector. After a period of sustained growth,
e number of public high schools over the 16–18
e population group8 increased dramatically in the
mid-1980s to resume a more moderate growth path
thereafter. This was the result of a long term change in
educational policies that started in the 1950s with the
expansion of primary and secondary education, and
accelerated in the 1970s as a result of a government
strategy to promote educational attainment beyond
compulsory education (Go´mez, 1999). Moreover, follow-
ing recommendations by international organizations
Fig. 1. Per capita number of public and private high schools over the 16–
18 age population.
Source: authors’ calculations based on data from the Mexican School
Census.
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Fig. 3. Number of students per public and private high school.
Source: authors’ calculations based on data from the Mexican School
Census.
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Fig. 2. Enrolment rate in public and private high schools.
Source: authors’ calculations based on data from the Mexican School
Census.
www.oportunidades.gob.mx/informacion_general/main.html. Note
t either one of these schemes affected the schooling choices of the
ividuals in our sample since all individuals started high school before
01 (See Section 4 for details).
In 2007 only 2% of Mexican students beneﬁted from a student loan.
is is a very small proportion even relative to other Latin American
untries such as Colombia and Brazil, where, respectively, 9% and 6% of
llege students have a loan (Educaﬁn, 2007).
These are available at http://www.sep.gob.mx.
Population data obtained from the National Population Council
nsejo Nacional de Poblacio´n or CONAPO): http://www.conapo.gob.mx.
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vestment in education to those levels offering the
ighest rates of return—i.e. primary education and
chnological high schools—as a means to face the
conomic crisis of the early 1980s. During the 1990s, the
ublic sector continued to expand faster than the private
ector, especially after 1993, thus remaining the main high
chool education provider.
The increase in the number of high schools resulted in
creasing enrolment rates (number of entrants over the
6–18 age population group) in both public and private
chools (see Fig. 2). From 1970 to the mid 1980s, enrolment
ates in public high schools experienced a much larger
crease than in private high schools (24% versus 4%). A
imilar albeit less marked trend is observed during the
990s, when enrolment rates increased by 10% in public
igh schools and 3% in private high schools. As a result, by
000 private high school enrolment, at 9%, was substan-
ally lower than public high school enrolment, at 33%.
Despite the increasing enrolment rates, the number of
ublic high schools increased more than the number of
tudents. Consequently, the size of the public sector
eﬁned as the number of students per public high school)
as decreased since the beginning of the 1980s (Fig. 3). In
ontrast, the number of students per private high school
emained almost unchanged from 1970 to 2000.
We expect that these changes in availability and size of
rivate and public high schools affected the decisions of
ose enroling in high school, particularly since the mid
980s. As we will discuss in Section 4.2, there is also
ubstantial variation across states. In the next sections we
cus on a sample of workers aged 23–35 in 2008, who hence
nroled in high school starting in the late 1980s, and exploit
e reported variation over time and across states to identify
e differential effect of studying in a private high school
elative to a public high school) on wages.
. Empirical strategy
In order to quantify the wage returns to attending a
rivate relative to a public high school, we specify the
llowing wage equation:
s
ija ¼ b0 þ j j þ la þ dPvHSija þ X0ijab þ esija (1)
here wsijais the logarithm of real hourly earnings for
dividual i aged a with education level s = {high school,
ollege} and living in state j. PvHSija, our main variable of
terest, is an indicator variable that equals one if i studied
 a private high school, and zero otherwise. Xija is a matrix
f observable individual characteristics that were pre-
etermined at the time when the private/public high
chool choice was made and thus might have affected this
hoice, namely gender and a dummy accounting for
hether i lives with her parents.9 jj are dummies for
e state of residence in 2008, included to control for any
permanent regional differences and labour market trends
that could affect earnings, and la are cohort dummies that
account for time effects. esija is the error term.
bd measures the estimated effect of having studied in a
private relative to a public high school on wages. This
estimate will be biased if students sort into private and
public high schools based on factors that are not accounted
for in the regression but that matter for wages. In order to
correct for self-selection, we instrument PvHSija with two
measures of the relative availability of public (with respect
to private) high schools in the state and in the year when
the choice of the type of high school was made. Speciﬁcally,
we use: (i) the logarithm of the share of public high
schools, SharePbija; and (ii) the logarithm of the relative
size of public high schools, SizePbija. Both SharePbija and
SizePbija are measured in the state of residence j and in the
year when individual i was a ¼ 14 years old, which is the
age before the median high school entry age in Mexico and
thus that when the decision on which high school to attend
is made (see Section 4.1 for more details).
We construct SharePb by dividing the number of public
high schools over the total (private and public) number of
high schools in a given state and year. It measures the share
or proportion of public high schools and hence it is a proxy
for the potential availability of public relative to private
high schools in the year before the individual enters high
school. The effective relative availability of public high
schools will depend both on the number of schools and on
the number of vacancies in a school (i.e. on the size of the
school). In the absence of data on the actual number of
places available in a given school, we use the number of
students enroled in a school as a proxy for school capacity.
Hence, we construct SizePb by dividing the total number of
students enroled in public high schools in a given state and
year over the total number of students enroled in high
schools (private and public) in that state and year, and take
this as a measure of the relative size of the public high
school sector—i.e. the higher the proportion of students in
public high schools, the larger the relative size of the public
high school sector.
Taken together SharePbija and SizePbija capture the
effective availability of public relative to private high
schools in the state and in the year when the decision to
attend a private or a public high school is made, and as such
should signiﬁcantly affect this choice. Hence, we use two-
stage least squares (2SLS) to estimate the wage Eq. (1)
jointly with the following school equation:
PvHSija ¼ b˜0 þ j˜ j þ l˜a þ X0ijab˜ þ Z0ijag þ vija (2)
where Zija fSharePbija; SizePbijag are the instruments and
vija is the error term.
3.1. Identiﬁcation
By jointly estimating Eqs. (1) and (2), we identify the
effect of studying in a private relative to a public high
school on wages, bd, through the variation in the relative
availability and size of public high schools across age
cohorts and states. The identiﬁcation strategy exploits the
9 We do not include marital status, head of household nor being
mployed since these characteristics might have been affected by the
pe of school attended. Results (available upon request) are, however,
bust to the inclusion of these additional variables.
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C. Binelli, M. Rubio-Codina / Economics of Education Review 36 (2013) 198–215202ea that the state and year of start of high school
termine how much an individual has been exposed to
e increase in the relative availability of public and private
gh schools. In other words, the choice of studying in a
ivate or in a public high school varies depending on
hen and where the high school decision was made—i.e.
w many years a given age cohort has been exposed to
e schooling expansion and the extent to which high
hool availability increased in the state. The main
entiﬁcation assumption is therefore that in the absence
 a relative increase in private high schools’ availability,
anges in private high schools’ enrolment would not have
en systematically different in states with high and low
lative availability of public high schools.10
The validity of our ﬁndings depends on the validity of
e instruments, which in turn relies on the instruments
ing strongly correlated with the choice of studying at a
ivate or a public high school. In our setting, this means
at both the share and the relative size of public high
hools in the state and in the year before high school
rolment have to be important determinants of the
dividual decision to attend a private/public high school.
seems plausible to expect that if the proportion of public
gh schools and their relative size increase (decrease) at
e state level, students are more (less) likely to enrol in a
blic (private) high school. One may be concerned,
wever, that individual schooling decisions are driven by
e educational supply at a more local level such as the
ovince or the town of residence. This is unlikely to be the
se in Mexico, where within-state migration has become
ore and more common since 1970, especially towards
edium-sized cities (CONAPO, 1999). Further, the ﬁrst-
ge estimates will (and do) provide a direct measure of
e strong correlation between the instruments and the
gh school choice.
In addition, the instruments must be exogenous and
tisfy the exclusion restriction. This means that our
easures of effective relative availability of public high
hools must be uncorrelated with the error term in the
hool choice Eq. (2) and can only affect wages through
eir impact on the decision to attend a private or a public
gh school. In other words, the instruments cannot be
rrelated with any other variable that may also affect
our market outcomes, such as aggregate growth. In
ction 6 we provide direct evidence of the instruments’
lidity in our context and dismiss a number of potential
reats. Further, in order to address any lingering concerns,
e impose weaker validity assumptions on the instru-
ents and allow for the exclusion restriction to be violated
evo & Rosen, 2008). This allows us to derive bounds for
e effect of studying in a private high school on wages, so
at we can assess how much the exogeneity assumption
ives the results. Finally, the instruments must also have
ough variation over time and across states for identiﬁ-
tion, which is an issue we will return to in Section 4.2.
Note that by jointly estimating (1) and (2) on the
mple of workers, we obtain the ‘‘overall’’ return to
private high school attendance, which combines the effect
of studying in a private high school on college attendance,
on college completion, and on wages. To identify each of
these effects separately and to understand the mecha-
nisms whereby private high school attendance affects
wages, we will separately estimate the effect of studying at
a private relative to a public high school on wages by the
highest educational achieved—i.e. for those with complet-
ed high school education, uncompleted college and
completed college. Moreover, we will also estimate the
effect of private high school attendance on the probabili-
ties of completing high school, enroling into college and
completing college, and on the total number of years of
completed education.
4. Data
4.1. Sources
We use two main sources of data for the empirical
analysis: the National Survey on Labour and Educational
Trajectories (Encuesta Nacional de Trayectorias Educativas y
Labourales or ENTELEMS) and the Mexican School Census,
which we described in Section 2.1
The ENTELEMS survey was collected by the division of
SEP in charge of high school education. It was administered
to all 15–35 year olds who had completed at least one year
of high school education and were living in households
included in the third round of the 2008 Mexican National
Employment Survey (Encuesta Nacional de Ocupacio´n y
Empleo or ENOE).11 If there was more than one household
member satisfying these characteristics in any given
household, the individual whose birth date was closer to
the date of the interview was included. Overall, the
ENTELEMS surveyed 34,901 individuals, or about 8.5% of
the individuals surveyed in the 2008 ENOE.
The survey contains information on basic individual
characteristics (sex, age, marital status, head of household
and number of children—although only for women),
current and previous employment status, type of employ-
ment, hours of work, wages, years of high school and
college education completed, state where high school and
college were attended, and, crucially for us, whether the
individual attended a private or a public high school and/or
college.12 For those still living with their parents, we can
use ENOE data to construct parental education and
parental employment. In addition, for the sub-sample of
11 The ENOE is Mexico’s main employment survey and is collected by
the National Statistical Ofﬁce (INEGI) every three months on a nationally
representative sample of 120,260 households. It has a rotating panel
structure and it includes detailed information on employment, education
and household socio-demographics. The ENOE contains accurate data on
wages and has been widely used for studies of the Mexican labour market
(e.g. Bosch & Manacorda, 2010).
12 There is no information on whether an individual has switched
between private and public centres during high school. All questions refer
to the last high school the individual attended. To the best of our
knowledge, the only other available Mexican surveys that include
information on the public/private type of high school attended are theA similar type of age cohort and regional variation identiﬁcation
ategy has been used by Duﬂo (2001).
Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS) and the ENILEMS Survey, although
only for a very small number of workers.
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C. Binelli, M. Rubio-Codina / Economics of Education Review 36 (2013) 198–215 203ose aged 15–29, the ENTELEMS includes a module on
mployment trajectories, which we will exploit in
ection 6.2. We deﬂate wages to June 2011 using the
ost recent National Consumer Price Index data available
t the time of analysis.
We merge the ENTELEMS and the Mexican School
ensus datasets by state of residence and year at age 14,
hich is the age before the median high school entry age in
exico and thus the year when the decision on which high
chool to attend is made. 88% of the individuals in the
ample reside in the state where they went to high school
nd 84% continue to live in the state where they were born.
ence, the choice of the relevant state—birth, high school
ttendance, residence in 2008—at which to merge the
formation is trivial, and results (available upon request)
re robust to this choice. Regarding the year of entry into
igh school, the ENTELEMS includes a question on high
chool entry age. However, this question is only answered
onsistently—i.e. reports that are not at odds with the age
nd educational achievement of the respondent in 2008—
r about 40% of the sample and hence we deem it
nreliable. Instead, we assume that all individuals started
igh school at age 15, the sample and country median age
f high school entry (Domı´nguez & Pe´rez Go´mez, 1993),
nd merge the measures of school availability in the year
efore, at age 14. By doing so, we will obtain a lower bound
stimate of the impact of school availability and size on the
hoice to attend a private or a public high school.13
For each wage earner in the sample, the ﬁnal dataset
ontains data on wages, education choices, and state-level
easures of effective public and private high school
vailability in the state and year when the choice to attend
 private or a public high school was made.14
4.2. Sample and descriptive statistics
Our ﬁnal sample consists of 8523 workers aged between
23 and 35 in 2008, who were not studying at the time of the
survey. This implies that individuals in the sample attended
high school between 1988 and 2000. We restrict the sample
to workers that are 23 years old and older to maximize the
likelihood that they have completed their education,
possibly including college. Table 1 presents summary
statistics on this sample. On average, those that have
attended a private high school (27% of the sample) are older,
more likely women, have a higher probability to live with
their parents (and consistently, a lower probability of being
heads of household), and are less likely to be working as
employees (as opposed to being self-employed) and married
or in partnership (as opposed to being single).
Fig. 4 shows that the proportion of individuals in the
sample that attended a private or a public high school is
well distributed across cohorts. We also observe lower
enrolments in private high schools amongst younger
cohorts: while only 22–24% of the 23–25 year old cohort
studied in a private high school, about 30% of the 32–35
year old cohort did. Note that, as shown in Fig. 5, the
proportion of individuals in the sample that attended a
private or a public high school is less well balanced across
states, which may be related to differences between states
in the relative availability and size of public relative to
private high schools.
Figs. 6–8 show that there is enough variability in the
value of the instruments across states and over time, as
required for identiﬁcation. The maps in Figs. 6 and 7
illustrate the variation of our measures of relative
availability and size of public high schools (SharePb and
SizePb) across states in 1987 and 1999, which are the years
when the oldest and the youngest cohort in the sample
were 14 and thus about to start high school. As shown,
both the proportion (share) of public high schools and its
relative size vary substantially across states. Moreover, not
all states follow a similar trend over time: while the
relative availability of public high schools increased in
some states, it remained almost constant or decreased in
some other states.
Fig. 8 shows that these variables also vary over time:
the share of the public high school sector increased from a
minimum value of 0.61 in 1987 to a maximum value of
0.63 in 1999, whereas the relative size of the public high
school sector (proportion of students enroled in public
high schools) decreased from around 0.74 in 1987 to 0.70
in the year 1999.
able 1
escriptive statistics.
Private high school (N = 2327) Public high school (N = 6196) t-Test
Mean SE Mean SE
Age 28.896 0.074 28.487 0.045 4.737
Female = 1 0.560 0.010 0.449 0.006 9.201
Living with parents = 1 0.431 0.010 0.393 0.006 3.267
Employee = 1 0.826 0.008 0.874 0.004 5.622
Married or in partnership = 1 0.458 0.103 0.518 0.006 4.918
Head of household = 1 0.304 0.009 0.358 0.006 4.710
3 We have investigated whether there are differences in the age at high
hool entrance by type of school attended amongst those that started
igh school between the age of 15 and 18. We ﬁnd that private high school
ttendees are marginally older (0.8 months) when they start high school.
his suggests that, if anything, our estimates underestimate the returns
n work experience for those attending private high school since we are
e facto assuming that they enroled in high school slightly earlier than
ey actually did.
4 We focus on high school education because of data availability but
lso because private high schools represent a homogenous group to
hich public high schools can be meaningfully compared. On the
ontrary, both private and public colleges are characterized by a
bstantial degree of heterogeneity (there are both very prestigious
rivate universities such as the Autonomous Technological Institute of
exico, and public universities such as the National Autonomous
niversity of Mexico), which makes the private–public comparison
ninformative unless the actual school attended was known.
Fig. 4. Proportion of individuals in the sample that attended a public or a private high school by age cohort.
Source: authors’ calculations based on the ENTELEMS survey.
Fig. 5. Proportion of individuals in the sample that attended a public or private high school by state.
Source: authors’ calculations based on the ENTELEMS Survey.
Fig. 6. Proportion of public high schools by state in year 1987 and 1999.
Source: authors’ calculations based on data from the Mexican School Census.
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In this section, we ﬁrst report OLS estimates of the
elationship between private high school attendance,
wages and school achievement. These estimates do not
control for the endogeneity of the school choice and are
reported for comparison purposes. We then report 2SLS
estimates, alongside the ﬁrst-stage relationships between
school choice and the instruments.
5.1. Preliminary evidence: ordinary least squares estimates
Table 2 presents OLS estimates of the returns to private
relative to public high schools. In the ﬁrst column, we
report estimates for the entire sample of analysis. In the
following columns we report estimates by the highest level
of education achieved: completed high school, uncom-
pleted college and completed college. We ﬁnd that the
estimated returns to studying in a private high school are
only statistically signiﬁcant for the sub-sample of college
graduates, and at around 5%. This is suggestive of a wage
premium associated to studying at a private high school,
for example due to a higher quality of education offered by
private schools. Consistently with this indicative evidence,
ig. 7. Relative size of public high schools by state in year 1987 and 1999.
ource: authors’ calculations based on data from the Mexican School Census.
.60
.65
.70
.75
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Share of public hi gh school s Rela ve size of public hi gh school s
Year
ig. 8. Share and relative size of public high schools.
ource: authors’ calculations based on data from the Mexican School
ensus.
able 2
age returns to private high school (OLS).
Log hourly earnings
All HS graduates Some college College graduates
Private high school = 1 0.019 0.029 0.017 0.046+
(0.018) (0.038) (0.021) (0.027)
Other covariates
Female = 1 0.107** 0.146** 0.067* 0.062*
(0.014) (0.025) (0.022) (0.027)
Living with parents = 1 0.074** 0.101** 0.068** 0.083*
(0.015) (0.018) (0.022) (0.026)
Observations 8523 2807 4217 3154otes: State-clustered standard errors in parentheses. Sample of workers aged 23–35 trimmed at bottom and top 0.5% of the earnings distribution. Hourly
arnings are expressed in June 2011 prices. All speciﬁcations include state and cohort dummies. +p  0.10; *p  0.05; **p  0.01.
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C. Binelli, M. Rubio-Codina / Economics of Education Review 36 (2013) 198–215206dividuals in the sample report perceived prestige and
ality of the school as the most common reason why they
ose to study in a private high school (37%), while this is
ly the third most common reason why students choose a
blic high school (20.9%). On the other hand, the most
mmonly reported reason to study in a public high school
distance to the house (34.4%), while this reason comes in
ird for private high schools, at 18.9%.15
Table 3 presents OLS estimates of private school
tendance (relative to public) on school attainment both
 the extensive margin—the probability of completing
gh school, of entering college and of successfully
mpleting college—and at the intensive margin, that is
e number of years of completed education. The ﬁrst
lumn reports the effect of private high school attendance
 the (unconditional) probability of completing high
hool for the entire sample and, the second column
ports the same probability conditional on entering the
our force upon high school completion. Perhaps
rprisingly, we ﬁnd that studying in a private high school
s a signiﬁcant negative effect on completing high school
d college, while it has a positive effect on enroling into
llege.
Since OLS estimates do not control for selection into the
pe of school, they are very likely to be driven by
observed individual and household characteristics that
ultaneously affect school choice, school performance,
ucational attainment and wages, amongst other factors.
e choice of attending a private rather than a public high
hool is likely to be positively correlated with the error
rm if private high schools attract better performing
dents, or if better performing students prefer to study at
ivate high schools because these schools are perceived to
ovide education of higher quality (as suggested above).
 it could also be the case that it is universities that
rceive private high schools as higher quality with
estigious colleges preferentially enroling students that
tended a private high school. Such positive correlation
uld be reduced by negative selection bias if private high
schools can only be afforded by rich families who would
send their children to study in the best schools disregard-
ing the level of their children’s ability. In order to obtain
unbiased estimates, we next control for selection.
5.2. Two stage least squares estimates
Table 4 presents 2SLS estimates of Eqs. (1) and (2). The
structure of the table is analogous to that of Table 2. We
ﬁnd an overall wage premium of 44% to having attended a
private high school for the entire sample of workers—i.e.
irrespective of whether they stopped studying at high
school or whether they continued onto college (column 1).
This premium increases to 53% for those that entered but
did not complete college (column 3), and to 60% for college
graduates (column 4). Nonetheless, we ﬁnd no differential
wage returns to completing a private relative to a public
high school for those that entered the labour market upon
high school graduation (column 2).
In the three regressions where we ﬁnd signiﬁcant
returns (columns 1, 3 and 4) both instruments in the ﬁrst
stage are highly signiﬁcant and have the expected sign: an
increase in the share and relative size of public high
schools decreases the probability of attending a private
relative to a public high school. The ﬁrst-stage statistics
show that the instruments are strong predictors of the
private/public high school choice (probability of the ﬁrst
stage F-test statistic <0.05 and Cragg–Donalds F-
statistic > 10), and the Sargan test for over-identifying
restrictions cannot reject the null that the instruments are
uncorrelated with the error term.16
Note that these returns are for the sample of workers
who report a positive wage. Such inclusion criterion could
bias our results if attending a private or a public high
school affected the probability of working or the probabil-
ity of reporting a wage. To dismiss this concern we jointly
estimate Eqs. (1) and (2) but replace the wage outcome
variable in Eq. (1) with the probability of working (or that
of reporting a positive wage). Results (available upon
ble 3
ool attainment (OLS).
High school completion = 1
Unconditional Conditional College attendance = 1 College completion = 1 Years completed education
rivate high school (HS) = 1 0.057** 0.135** 0.068* 0.041* 0.018
(0.015) (0.029) (0.024) (0.016) (0.092)
ther covariates
emale = 1 0.042** 0.074** 0.007 0.014 0.328**
(0.006) (0.029) (0.014) (0.011) (0.061)
iving with parents = 1 0.027** 0.025 0.112** 0.012 0.567**
(0.009) (0.019) (0.015) (0.011) (0.051)
ean dependent variable 0.824 0.652 0.600 0.911 13.903
bservations 8523 4306 7024 3461 8520
tes: State-clustered standard errors in parentheses. Sample of workers aged 23–35 trimmed at bottom and top 0.5% of the earnings’ distribution. All
eciﬁcations include state and cohort dummies. *p  0.05; **p  0.01.
Interest in the subjects and courses offered by a given high school 16 The correlation coefﬁcient between the log of SharePb and the log ofks as the second most important reason to attend both private (25.9%)
d public high schools (34.4%).
SizePb is 0.35, that is at most a moderate correlation, which allows to
credibly using the Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions.
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C. Binelli, M. Rubio-Codina / Economics of Education Review 36 (2013) 198–215 207equest) show that having attended a private high school
as no signiﬁcant effect neither on the decision to work nor
n the probability of reporting a positive wage, while the
struments remain strong and signiﬁcant in the ﬁrst
tage.
Table 5 presents 2SLS estimates of the school attain-
ent regressions at the extensive and intensive margins,
llowing the same structure as Table 3.17 For all
egressions, the ﬁrst stage results show that the instru-
ents are signiﬁcant and strong determinants of the
ecision to attend a private or a public high school.
owever, in contrast to the OLS results, we ﬁnd that
tudying in a private high school does not give any
dvantage in school progression and completion, except
r the probability of completing college education, which
 negatively affected by having attended a private high
chool (although the coefﬁcient is only signiﬁcant at the
0% level).
.3. Interpretation of the results
Both 2SLS (Table 4) and OLS (Table 2) results show a
ositive effect of attending a private high school on wages,
onditional on college completion. The difference between
em suggests that the OLS returns are affected by negative
election bias. This is consistent with the very high costs of
private high school attendance and their reputation of
being high quality so that while rich families can afford to
send their children to the best schools regardless of the
child’s ability, low income high ability students might not
be able to study at private high schools because of binding
credit constraints (Card, 1999, chap. 30). Indeed, as
discussed in Section 2, the average education cost (over
median household income) in Mexico is 8% higher for
students in private high schools than in public high
schools, and the availability of scholarships is very limited.
Consistently, Kaufmann (2009) has identiﬁed credit
constraints as one of the main reasons behind the low
college attendance and completion rates observed in
Mexico despite high wage returns.
We ﬁnd that the 2SLS estimates exceed OLS estimates
by around 55%. Are the 2SLS returns over-estimated? An
extensive empirical literature has estimated returns to
education by using changes in school availability as
instruments for educational choices using supply-side
variables as a source of identiﬁcation to estimate demand-
side parameters (Card, 2001; Duﬂo, 2001). As noted by
Card (2001), the use of changes in schools availability—
such as changes in college proximity—can result in an
over-estimation of the returns to school if the correlation
between ability and education is different for different
individuals, for example if it is higher for individuals that
live closer to the schools. Imbens and Angrist (1994) show
that in the case of heterogeneous returns to schooling, the
IV estimate of the returns to education can be interpreted
as a local average treatment effect (LATE) and computed as
the weighted average of the marginal returns in the
population where the weight of each person is given by the
relative size of the increment in schooling due to changes
in the instruments. The difference between the LATE and
the average return depends on the covariance between the
marginal returns and the change in schooling induced by
able 4
age returns to private high school (2SLS).
Log hourly earnings
All HS graduates Some college College graduates
Endogenous explanatory variable
Private high school (HS) = 1 0.436þ 0.104 0.532* 0.597*
(0.268) (0.501) (0.263) (0.271)
Other covariates
Female = 1 0.143** 0.153* 0.081** 0.079*
(0.025) (0.071) (0.022) (0.029)
Living with parents = 1 0.089** 0.103* 0.085* 0.109**
(0.019) (0.033) (0.027) (0.032)
First stage
lg(Share public HS) 0.199** 0.120* 0.297** 0.299**
(0.031) (0.050) (0.044) (0.053)
lg(Relative size public HS) 0.302** 0.089 0.376** 0.412**
(0.070) (0.117) (0.101) (0.125)
prob > F-stat ﬁrst stage 0.000 0.039 0.000 0.002
Cragg–Donald Wald F-stat 22.754 2.948 26.078 19.11
P-Value Sargan test 0.469 0.185 0.934 0.310
Observations 8504 2800 4209 3148
otes: State-clustered standard errors in parentheses. Sample of workers aged 23–35 trimmed at bottom and top 0.5% of the earnings distribution. Hourly
arnings are expressed in June 2011 prices. All speciﬁcations include state and cohort dummies. þp  0.10; *p  0.05; **p  0.01.
7 When estimating the probability of attending or completing a given
ducation level, both the outcome and the endogenous variable are
inary, which means that the ﬁrst stage conditional expectation function
 likely to be non-linear. This violates the linearity assumption of the
SLS estimator (Angrist, 2001), and can be addressed using the
ooldridge (2002, chap. 18) two-steps procedure. When using such
rocedure, we obtain very similar results, which suggests that the model
 not identiﬁed off the probit functional form. Hence, we only report the
sults obtained via the standard 2SLS.
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C. Binelli, M. Rubio-Codina / Economics of Education Review 36 (2013) 198–215208e instruments. An IV procedure based on exogenous
riation that affects the educational choices of higher
turns individuals more than the educational choices of
wer returns individuals will tend to produce an over-
timate of the average return to education. Thus, IV
chniques will typically over-estimate the average return
there is heterogeneity in the returns. While we cannot
rectly test the heterogeneity in returns nor exclude it, in
ction 6.6 we will use a technique recently developed by
vo and Rosen (2008) that relaxes the assumption of
struments’ exogeneity and thus allows the instruments
 be correlated with unobservables including unobserv-
le individual characteristics that may result in heterog-
ous returns.
 Threats to identiﬁcation
In our setting, the exogeneity condition requires that
e instruments are uncorrelated with the error term in the
hooling Eq. (2). Similarly, the exclusion restriction
quires that changes in the relative availability and size
 public high schools affect wages only through their
pact on the decision to attend a private or a public high
hool. As we discuss next, violation of the instruments’
lidity could occur if there were demand-driven changes
 high school provision, endogenous placement bias,
itted state-level factors, and between states migration,
ongst others. We also investigate the role of confound-
g factors, such as quality of education and competition
fects, the role of family background and that of following
more academic high school track, which could also
olate the validity of the instruments. Finally, we follow
vo and Rosen (2008) to directly test the robustness of
r ﬁndings to weaker identiﬁcation assumptions, namely
 explicitly allowing for the instruments to be correlated
ith the error term in the outcome equation.
6.1. Demand-driven changes in high school provision and
endogenous placement bias
Identiﬁcation is threatened if changes in the relative
availability and size of public high schools were demand
driven or, in other words, if there was feedback from the
individual demand for public and private high school
education to the aggregate relative availability and size
of high schools in a given state at different points in
time.
There are several reasons to partially dismiss this
concern. First, as discussed in Section 2.1, while the per
capita number of private and public high schools increased
(Fig. 1), the number of students per public high school
decreased and the number of students per private high
school remained stable (Fig. 3). This is consistent with a
decrease in the demand for public high school education
and a stable demand for private high school education.
Further, the inclusion of state and cohort dummies
controls for aggregate time-invariant variables—such as
the supply of health care facilities in a given state and
year—that can be correlated with the individual and, in
turn, with the aggregate demand for schooling.
However, the endogeneity problem would not be
solved if the individual demand for high school varied
over time and across states. Hence, we re-estimate our
benchmark speciﬁcation by including a full set of state-
year interactions to control for differential time trends by
state. We have divided the 1987–1999 period in four sub-
periods: 1987–1989, 1990–1992, 1993–1995, and 1996–
1999, and use the 1987–1989 period as the reference
group. Returns are even larger after the inclusion of these
state-year period dummies (Model 1 in Table 6) and are
robust to alternative deﬁnitions of the sub-period dum-
mies (results available upon request), while the instru-
ments remain signiﬁcant and strong in the ﬁrst stage.
ble 5
ool attainment (2SLS).
High school completion = 1
Unconditional Conditional College attendance = 1 College completion = 1 Years completed education
ndogenous explanatory variable
rivate high school (HS) = 1 0.021 0.161 0.009 0.219+ 0.541
(0.163) (0.299) (0.203) (0.123) (1.321)
ther covariates
emale = 1 0.035* 0.029 0.012 0.018+ 0.377**
(0.016) (0.048) (0.017) (0.011) (0.119)
iving with parents = 1 0.024* 0.036 0.116** 0.019* 0.586**
(0.011) (0.023) (0.018) (0.009) (0.071)
irst stage
g(Share public HS) 0.199** 0.101* 0.225** 0.297** 0.199**
(0.031) (0.041) (0.034) (0.050) (0.031)
g(Relative size public HS) 0.302** 0.266* 0.233** 0.459** 0.302**
(0.070) (0.096) (0.079) (0.118) (0.070)
rob > F-stat ﬁrst stage 0.000 0.042 0.000 0.000 0.000
ragg–Donald Wald F-stat 22.754 4.326 24.582 21.847 22.750
-Value Sargan Test 0.879 0.538 0.486 0.746 0.203
ean dependent variable 0.824 0.652 0.600 0.911 13.903
bservations 8504 4295 7009 3454 8501
otes: State-clustered standard errors in parentheses. Sample of workers aged 23–35 trimmed at bottom and top 0.5% of the earnings’ distribution. All
eciﬁcations include state and cohort dummies. þp  0.10; *p  0.05; **p  0.01.
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C. Binelli, M. Rubio-Codina / Economics of Education Review 36 (2013) 198–215 209The relative increase in the number of public high
chools would also be endogenous if the government
olicy to expand public education had a compensatory
ature, that is if the government decided to increase
chool availability more in states that had fewer high
chools, lower enrolment or educational attainment
ates, lower income levels, etc. On the one hand, the lack
f an identiﬁable pattern in the variation of the
struments across states and over time plotted in
Figs. 6–8 suggests that endogenous placement bias is not
a serious concern. On the other hand, the 1992
Compensatory Programs (PARE and PAREIB), which were
introduced as part of the 1992 Ley de la Modernizacio´n de
la Educacio´n Ba´sica y Normal, explicitly aimed at closing
education inequalities at the primary and secondary
school level (Martinez-Rizo, 2001). As such, the concern
that the expansion of high school also has a compensa-
tory nature is valid.
able 6
obustness checks.
Log hourly earnings
Benchmark Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Endogenous explanatory variable
Private high school (HS) = 1 0.597* 0.627* 0.656* 0.693* 0.586* 0.734** 0.643+ 0.582* 0.621*
(0.271) (0.244) (0.273) (0.246) (0.272) (0.280) (0.344) (0.277) (0.227)
Other covariates
Female = 1 0.079* 0.081* 0.081* 0.093* 0.080* 0.079* 0.083* 0.081* 0.091*
(0.029) (0.031) (0.030) (0.033) (0.029) (0.028) (0.030) (0.029) (0.032)
Living with parents = 1 0.109** 0.117** 0.111** 0.130** 0.108** 0.118** 0.109* 0.108** 0.111**
(0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.035) (0.033) (0.029)
Yearly GDP growth by state 0.806
(0.766)
Yearly growth education expenditure by state 0.000
(0.009)
State of birth same as state of high school = 1 0.061
(0.043)
lg(Number of teachers per class private HS) 0.407+
(0.237)
lg(Number of teachers per class public HS) 1.738**
(0.380)
lg(Relative size public HS) 0.163
(0.153)
First stage
lg(Share public HS) 0.299** 0.338** 0.308** 0.299** 0.306** 0.294** 0.281** 0.299** 0.324**
(0.053) (0.076) (0.076) (0.083) (0.075) (0.076) (0.075) (0.075) (0.079)
lg(Relative size public HS) 0.412** 0.369* 0.407* 0.306+ 0.419* 0.452* 0.346* 0.412* 0.392*
(0.125) (0.177) (0.147) (0.175) (0.145) (0.171) (0.161) (0.147) (0.159)
Yearly GDP Growth by state 0.094
(0.558)
Yearly growth education expenditure by state 0.000
(0.004)
State of birth same as state of high school = 1 0.069*
(0.026)
lg(Number of teachers per class private HS) 0.367
(0.249)
lg(Number of teachers per class public HS) 0.486
(0.396)
State dummies  year period dummies YES
Cohort dummies  enrolment rates 1980 YES
Cohort dummies  yearly GDP growth by State YES
Dummies State of birth YES
Quality of education  relative availability
and size public HS in 1980
YES
Prob > F-stat ﬁrst stage 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.005 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.000 0.001
Cragg–Donald Wald F-stat 19.11 20.234 19.388 13.875 19.376 15.800 15.010 38.070 18.957
P-Value Sargan test 0.310 0.832 0.501 0.316 0.316 0.349 0.479 0.163
Observations 3148 3148 3148 2577 3148 3146 3148 3148 2742
otes: State-clustered standard errors in parentheses. Sample of workers aged 23–35 trimmed at bottom and top 0.5% of the earnings distribution.
  0.10; *p  0.05; **p  0.01. Model 1: interaction terms between State and year period (1990–1992, 1993–1995, 1996–1999) dummies. Reference group
 period 1987–1989. Model 2: interaction terms between cohort dummies and enrolment rates in 1980 before high school expansion. Model 3: yearly
rowth real education expenditure and yearly GDP growth by State for each year between 1993 and 2000 as additional controls. Model 4: interaction terms
etween cohort dummies and yearly GDP growth by state. Model 5: state of birth dummies and indicator variable state of birth and state where high school
as attended coincide. Model 6: control for measures of education quality and for their interaction with relative availability and size of public high schools
 1980. Model 7: relative proportion private high schools is the only instrument. Model 8: sample of those with bachillerato general and tecnolo´gico.
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C. Binelli, M. Rubio-Codina / Economics of Education Review 36 (2013) 198–215210We use GDP data and the locality marginality index
llected by the National Population Council (Consejo
cional de Poblacio´n or CONAPO), aggregated at the state
el, to classify localities by socio-economic status and
vestigate the extent to which the high school expansion
correlated with state-level socio-economic variables.19
ots of the expansion of public and private high schools by
ar and type of state (‘low SES’, ‘high SES’) (available upon
quest) show that from 1994 onwards (that is after the
92 reform) there has been a faster increase in the
mber of public high schools in low SES and GDP states,
d a larger increase in the number of private high schools
 high SES and GDP states, which conﬁrms the concern for
dogenous placement bias. We address this concern in
ur distinct ways. First, we re-estimate Eqs. (1) and (2) by
cluding as additional controls interaction terms between
hort dummies and enrolment rates in 1980, that is
fore the booming expansion of the mid-1980s
ection 2.1). We report results in Model 2 in Table 6. As
own, the returns to college conditional on private high
hool attendance remain positive and signiﬁcant, at 66%.
e ﬁrst stage estimates conﬁrm the ability of the
struments to strongly predict the choice of high school.
Second, we include GDP growth and growth in
ucation expenditures in the state as additional regres-
rs (Model 3 Table 6). These variables may be correlated
ith changes in the availability of high schools and have an
dependent effect on wages (for example through an
crease in job vacancies). In addition, in Model 4 in
ble 6, we allow GDP growth to have differential effects
 cohort by adding a full set of interaction terms between
hort dummies and GDP growth by state.20 As shown,
sults are robust to the inclusion of these variables and
e instruments remain strong determinants of the choice
 attending a private high school.
Third, we use census data for the year 1980, 1990, 1995,
d 2000 to compute the proportion of households with
ctricity, piped water, and a drainage system by state and
ar, and we add these variables as additional controls.21
e omission of infrastructure and services related
riables could also bias results since they may simulta-
ously affect the demand for education and wages.
sults (available upon request) remain unchanged after
e inclusion of these variables.
Finally, we assign to each individual the value of the
NAPO marginality index in the locality of (current)
sidence closest in time to the year when the individual
rted high school, and add this variable as an additional
gressor (assuming that the individual still resides in the
cality where (s)he attended high school). Results
vailable upon request) conﬁrm our main ﬁndings. In
rticular, as expected, the marginality index is negatively
rrelated with the choice of attending a private high
school. In addition, we ﬁnd that it is positively correlated
with wages, which is consistent with higher marginality
being associated with higher wage inequality. In the ﬁrst
stage the instruments remain very strong and statistically
signiﬁcant, and the returns to private high school are
conﬁrmed to be at around 0.60 and statistically signiﬁcant
at the 5% level.
6.2. Between-states migration
It is also plausible that high school entrants migrated
across states in search for better schools. This type of
migration would bias the results since the estimated
impact of the schooling availability measures on the choice
of school would reﬂect in part individual self-selection. As
discussed in Section 4.1, about 84% of the individuals in the
sample attended high school in the state where they were
born and 88% live in the state where they went to high
school. Hence, in our sample the proportion of those that
moved states in search of better educational opportunities
at high school is at most 16%, which is likely to be
insufﬁcient to bias the estimation results.
Most importantly, the proportion of those that moved
between the year of birth and the year of high school
attendance does not seem to be driven by a search for more
and/or better schools. Indeed, if we compute the propor-
tion of the sample that attended high school in a state other
than the state of birth by age cohort, we ﬁnd that overtime
changes in this proportion are not correlated with either
changes in the relative availability or in the relative size of
public high schools, or with changes in standard measures
of education quality (student–teacher ratio and student–
class ratio for example). In addition, if we jointly estimate
Eqs. (1) and (2) but we replace the wage variable in Eq. (1)
with an indicator variable that equals one if the state of
birth is the same as the state where high school was
attended we ﬁnd that having attended a private high
school does not have any signiﬁcant effect (coefﬁcient
0.017, se 0.297). As usual, the instruments remain strong
and signiﬁcant in the ﬁrst stage. These results are available
upon request.
As a further robustness check, we re-estimate the
model by controlling for state of birth dummies and for an
indicator variable that is equal to one if the state of birth
and the state of high school attendance coincide. As shown
in Model 5 in Table 6, both instruments remain highly
signiﬁcant in the ﬁrst stage and returns to college and
private high school are estimated at a signiﬁcant 73%.
6.3. Quality of education and competition effects
A further concern on the validity of the instruments
relates to education quality. In addition to changes in
availability, private and public high schools have followed
different trends in terms of education ‘‘quality’’. Figs. 9
and 10 report the evolution of the number of students per
teacher and the number of students per class between
1987 and 1999 for private and public high schools, which
we have constructed using data from the School Census.
Over time, the number of students per teacher is
consistently higher in public high schools, which suggests
This index is computed every ﬁve years using locality socioeconomic
icators collected as part of the Population Census and Conteo (smaller
sus).
Since GDP data by state are only available between 1993 and 2000, we
ve interpolated the yearly growth rate of per capita GDP by state for the
vious years.
Note that we linearly interpolate the data for the years in between.
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eachers have to share their time and attention with a
rger number of students (Fig. 9). Moreover, this
quality’’ gap increased during the 1990s with respect
o the 1980s: the number of students per teacher in public
igh schools by 1999 was double the number of students
er teacher in private high schools, on average. Fig. 10
rovides additional evidence of a quality differential
etween private and public high schools: despite the
eduction in the number of students per class being
ommon to both types of schools, it has been faster in
rivate high schools, which suggests a trend towards
igher quality in these schools. On average, in 1999, there
ere around ten more students per class in public than in
rivate high schools.22
The ﬁnding that private high schools are of higher
uality is consistent with evidence in the literature
howing that in Mexico students in private high schools
erform better in standardized assessments than students
 public high schools (e.g. Gamboa & Waltenberg, 2011;
Somers, McEwan, & Willms, 2004; The World Bank, 2005)
as well as recent evidence from the Mexican National
Assessment of Academic Achievement in School Centers
(Evaluacio´n Nacional del Logro Acade´mico en Centros
Escolares or ENLACE).23
The increase in the availability of high schools
documented in Fig. 1 could have affected quality of
education differentially across states depending on the
initial availability of schools in a given state. To assess the
extent to which education quality explains the differen-
tial return, we include the logarithm of the number of
teachers per class in public schools and the logarithm of
the number of teachers per class in private schools in our
benchmark speciﬁcation. In order to account for the
possibility that education quality changed differentially
in states with initial differential availability levels, we
also add the interaction between these variables and the
relative availability and size of public high school in 1980
(that is before the high schools’ expansion). Estimation
results reported in Model 6 in Table 6 show that the
college premium to having attended a private high school
is at around 64%, and that both measures of education
quality matter for wages, while they do not have a
signiﬁcant effect on the decision of which type of school
to attend.
Quality of education could also have been affected by
competition effects between public and private high
schools. For example, the increased presence of private
high schools in a state may have exerted pressure on public
high schools to offer better education in order to retain
students. Competition from private schools has been found
to raise educational attainment and wages (Hoxby, 1994
for the US; Angrist, Bettinger, Bloom, King, & Kremer, 2002
for Colombia) as well as teachers’ salaries (Hensvik, 2010,
for Sweden). However, other papers ﬁnd that private
schools are ‘cream skimming’ drawing the best schools out
of the public sector, rather than competing on the basis of
value added (Hsieh & Urquiola, 2003, for Chile). Overall, the
effect of competition from private high schools on student
achievement and wages seems to vary depending on the
data set, the outcome, and the competition variable
(Jepsen, 1999).
We assess the role of competition effects by allowing
the relative size of private high schools to affect wages
directly. This implies that, in this new speciﬁcation, we use
the relative proportion of private high schools as the only
instrument. Model 7 in Table 6 presents the results.
Relative availability remains strong and signiﬁcant in the
ﬁrst stage and relative size does not signiﬁcantly affect
wages. We thus ﬁnd no evidence of competition effects
from private to public high schools. Importantly, when
using relative availability as the only instrument, the
impact of studying at a private high school on college
wages remains strong and signiﬁcant and close in
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ig. 9. Students per teacher in public and private high schools.
ource: authors’ calculations based on data from the Mexican School
ensus.
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ig. 10. Students per class in public and private high schools.
ource: authors’ calculations based on data from the Mexican School
ensus.
2 We obtain very similar results if we use alternative measures of
ducation quality such as the number of teachers per school and the
umber of teachers per class, which are commonly used in the literature
23 ENLACE data can be downloaded from http://www.enlace.sep.-
gob.mx/. In contrast with the evidence from the raw data, using ENLACE
2008 data De Hoyos, Espino, and Garcı´a (2011) ﬁnd no effect of privates measures of the effective supply of teachers (e.g. Black and Smith,
006; Card & Krueger, 1996).
high school on test scores once a vast array of individual and parental
characteristics is controlled for.
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odel.
. Family background and better jobs after graduation
Family background factors such as parental education
d income could be one of the main reasons why private
gh schools are chosen over public ones. First, given the
gh costs of private schools and the limited availability of
nding for private schooling (see Section 2), ﬁnancial costs
e the main barrier to enter private high schools and only
gh income families might be able to afford private
ucation. Second, families with a preference for private
gh schools could be better connected socially and
ofessionally, which could in turn facilitate ﬁnding better
d higher paying jobs for their children. Indeed, network
fects seem to be important: when looking at the reasons
 study at high school, being inﬂuenced by friends and
ighbours accounts for double the answers as a reason to
tend a private rather than a public high school (6.4% for
blic high schools and 15.5% for private high schools).
Unfortunately, the available data do not allow to
rectly control for family background. As noted in
ction 4.1, the ENTELEMS survey only reports information
 parental level of education and work status for the sub-
mple of young that were living with their parents at the
e of the survey, which represents less than half of our
mple and it is a highly selected sub-sample.24 However,
e available data allow exploring the effect of attending a
ivate or a public high school on the type of jobs after
aduation, which is arguably one of the important
annels whereby family factors can affect labour out-
mes, and hence assess the extent to which the omission
of family background variables is likely to threaten
identiﬁcation.
The ENTELEMS survey contains data on the employ-
ment trajectories after college graduation for the sub-
sample of those aged between 23 and 29 in 2008. We
exploit these data to shed light on the role of private
high schools in facilitating entrance into the labour
market and accessing better jobs by comparing the type
of occupations in the ﬁrst and second jobs after college
graduation for private and public high school graduates.
Because the data do not include the year of college
graduation, we use the year of high school graduation
plus ﬁve years (which is the average length of a college
degree in Mexico) as a proxy. Due to the young age of
this sub-sample of workers, only a handful of individuals
report having been employed on a third job after college.
We therefore only consider the ﬁrst two jobs after
college graduation.
Table 7 compares weekly hours and monthly wages for
the ﬁrst and second job after college graduation for
graduates that have attended a private or a public high
school. For the ﬁrst job after college graduation we
additionally know whether the individual is salaried or
self-employed, and whether he or she holds a professional
position. We consider two types of professional jobs: ‘‘type
A’’ that includes white collar-type jobs such as teachers,
doctors, lawyers, architects, designers, and consultants,
executives and other high-rank ﬁrm employees, and ‘‘type
B’’ that includes liberal (arts) jobs. The ﬁnal column reports
the t-statistic of the difference in means.
Consistently with our main ﬁndings, average wages in
both the ﬁrst and in the second job after college graduation
are signiﬁcantly higher for graduates that attended a
private high school and increasingly higher in the second
relative to the ﬁrst job after graduation (the wage gap
increases from 389 to 879 real Mexican pesos per month).
Nonetheless, we do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant difference in
the prevalence of self-employment and professional jobs
performed by college graduates that have attended a
private rather than a public high school, which suggests
that both private and public high school graduates have
access to similar types of jobs, at least soon after entering
the job market, and conditional on college graduation.
Further, and consistently with this ﬁnding, unreported
results, (available upon request), show that our benchmark
2SLS results in Table 4 remain unchanged if we add the
ble 7
s After Graduation
Private high school Public high school T-stat
N Mean SD N Mean SD dif
irst job after college
eekly hours 288 41.500 12.560 816 41.654 14.234 0.154 0.265
onthly wage 286 6075.927 3241.247 813 5686.935 3494.991 388.992 2.004
elf-employed = 1 288 0.052 0.223 816 0.044 0.205 0.008 0.555
rofessional A = 1 288 0.431 0.496 816 0.434 0.496 0.003 0.119
rofessional B = 1 288 0.201 0.402 816 0.223 0.417 0.022 1.473
econd job after college
eekly hours 124 40.645 15.493 325 42.289 13.237 1.644 1.838
onthly wage 124 7194.193 5037.703 323 6314.749 4080.520 879.444 3.251
By comparing mean characteristics, individuals still living with their
rents are younger, less likely to be married, and more likely to enrol in a
vate rather than in a public high school. The Mexican Family Life
rvey (MxFLS) reports information on parental education level and work
tus for all individuals in the sample and can be used to construct
ormation on family networks (Angelucci, De Giorgi, Rangel, & Rasul,
10). However, it does so only for a very small number of workers, which
es not allow to credibly estimate the wage returns to private schooling
ing IV (e.g. in the MxFLS 2005 there is information on 445 workers aged
tween 23 and 35 that have completed college; out of these, 75 attended
rivate high school and 370 attended a public high school).
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ontrol in our model.
.5. High school track
Finally, we assess the robustness of our results to
edeﬁning the estimation sample by conditioning on the
ype of high school attended. Unreported plots (available
pon request) using SEP data on the number of private
nd public high schools by track and year between 1990
nd 2000 show that the expansion of public high schools
as mainly due to an expansion of bachillerato general
nd te´cnico, which, as discussed in Section (2), are the two
ypes of high school that allow access to college
ducation.
If attending a private high school has a positive impact
n wages, and especially on the wages of those that have
ompleted college, we would expect to estimate a
tronger impact of studying at a private high school on
he restricted sample of workers that followed a more
cademic (i.e. college-oriented) track at high school. We
xploit the information in the ENTELEMS on the
cademic versus technical type of high school attended
y dropping from the estimation sample all individuals
hat studied in a technical high school (professional
´cnico). Results in Model 8 in Table 6 conﬁrm our
xpectations: returns to college if a private high school
as been completed are estimated at around 62% on this
ub-sample, which is around 2% higher than the average
eturns estimated for the entire sample in our benchmark
peciﬁcation. The instruments remain strong and signiﬁ-
ant in the ﬁrst stage.
Further, in our data the proportion of private high
chools’ students is at around 34% both for bachillerato
eneral and for profesional te´cnico, and at around 8% for
achillerato tecnolo´gico, which indicates that bachilerato
eneral students are over-represented and bachilerato
´cnico are under-represented with respect to the national
verages in 2008 (see Section 2). If we run a robustness
heck using the sample of bachillerato general only, we ﬁnd
at in the ﬁrst stage the instruments remain very strong
nd statistically signiﬁcant, and the returns to private high
chool continue to be at around 0.61 and statistically
igniﬁcant at the 5% level.
.6. Relaxing the exogeneity assumption: bounding the return
While the evidence so far is reassuring, doubts often
emain as to whether the instruments satisfy validity
ince the exogeneity condition of no correlation with the
rror term is not directly testable and could be violated if
eturns are heterogenous (as discussed in Section 5.3).
lso there are some variables—such as family back-
round and school peer effects—that are potentially
portant to explain wages but which we cannot directly
ontrol for in the analysis given the available data. In this
ection we use the method developed by Nevo and Rosen
2008) to allow for correlation between the instruments
nd the error term, and derive bounds for the wage
eturns to private high school. As in other recent
2010; Reinhold & Woutersen, 2009), we investigate the
extent to which relaxing the exogeneity assumption
affects our ﬁndings.
Following Nevo and Rosen (2008), we assume that:
1 The correlation between the endogenous variable and
the error term, and between the instruments and the
error term have the same sign. All the potential threats to
identiﬁcation that we discussed in Section 6 suggest that
the potential correlation between our instruments and
the error term in the wage equation is likely to be
positive. Also, as discussed at the end of Section 5.1, the
most likely correlation between the endogenous variable
and the error term is positive. Finally, the ﬁrst stage
estimates showed that both instruments have a negative
effect on the endogenous variable. If assumption 1 holds
and, as in our case, the covariance between the
endogenous variable and the instruments is negative,
Nevo and Rosen (2008) show that we have a two-sided
bound given by B = [bOLS, bIV].
2 The correlation between the instruments and the error
term is less strong in absolute terms than the
correlation between the endogenous variable and the
error term. This assumption weakens the validity
assumption of zero correlation between the instru-
ments and the error term, thus allowing to obtain
tighter bounds. We believe that it is reasonable to
expect the relative availability and size of public high
schools in the state and year before high school
enrolment to be less correlated with the error term
in the wage equation than it is the individual choice of
the type of high school to attend.
If, as in our case, assumption 1 and 2 are satisﬁed, Nevo
and Rosen (2008) show that we obtain a two-sided bound
given by:
B ¼ ½bIV ; bIV 
where bIV

is a 2SLS estimator in which the instruments
are re-deﬁned as SharePb

= (sSharePbPvHS  sPvHSSharePb)
and SizePb

= (sSizePbPvHS  sPvHSSizePb) where sPvHS,
sSharePb, and sSizePb are, respectively, the standard
deviation of the endogenous variable and of each
instrument. When, as in our case, there are multiple
instruments, the upper and the lower bound are
identiﬁed, respectively, by the lowest bIV and by the
highest bIV

obtained by running separate regressions
that use each instrument in turn.
We estimate the bounds of the effect of attending a
private high school on wages for the main sample of
college graduates for the benchmark speciﬁcation in
Table 6, and we ﬁnd that B = [0.077, 0.582]. Therefore,
when we relax the exogeneity assumption the wage
returns to private high school are still positive and
higher than the wage returns estimated with OLS.
Unfortunately, the bounds are too wide to be informa-
tive on the point estimate of the returns, but, taken
together with the evidence presented in the previous
sections, suggest that there are substantial and robust
wage returns to private high school for those that
omplete college education.pplications of this approach (e.g. Fitzsimons & Malde, c
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Assessing the relative efﬁciency of private and public
hools is important for a number of reasons. First, the
ivate sector can be used to expand educational
ovision under conditions of increasing demand for
hooling and limited funding for social development.
cond, private schools are often regarded as more
ﬁcient than public schools to the extent that families
e willing to pay high tuition fees because of the greater
oice on offer, which satisﬁes particular educational
eferences (e.g. single-sex, religious schools or different
nguage alternatives), or because private schools are
garded as an easy way of getting a degree in exchange of
sh. A number of large-scale education reforms have
en proposed encouraging public schools to mimic the
chnologies of private schools and promoting access to
ivate schools via voucher and education subsidies. A
ading example is the nationwide school voucher
ogram implemented in Chile in 1980. A more recent
ample is the program of subsidies to private schools
troduced by the Mexican government in February
11.25 Hence, it is important to investigate whether
d via which mechanisms introducing a choice between
blic and private schools would help improving the
erall achievement of students (Goldhaber, 1996).
This paper quantiﬁes the relative efﬁciency of private
d public schools by measuring the impact of private high
hools on educational attainment and wages in Mexico.
e exploit the signiﬁcant increase in the relative
ailability and size of public high schools in the country
 the 1990s across states and over time as exogenous
ifters that affect individual choices to enrol in private
d public high schools. We ﬁnd that attending a private
gh school does not affect progression from high school to
llege but does increase wages conditional on college
mpletion. Moreover, the comparison between IV and
S results suggests that OLS estimates suffer from
gative selection bias, which is consistent with the very
gh costs of private high schools.
The contribution of this paper is to establish a positive
usal relationship between attending a private high
hool and wages in a middle income country. The main
itation of the empirical analysis is that the available
ta do not allow drawing a conclusive answer on the
act magnitude of the wage returns. Therefore, some
tes of caution are necessary when drawing policy
plications.
First, while the results are robust to a number of checks
 the validity of the instruments, we are not able to
count for potentially important unobserved factors that
uld explain part of the effect of private high schools on
ages such as peer effects and family background. Second,
ith the available data we can estimate the short-term
turns to private high schools, which might change in the
ng-run. Third, enrolment in private high schools is
pensive and those currently attending these schools are
ely to have access to relatively low-cost ﬁnancing. For
others, the cost of private schooling may be prohibitive.
Thus, while private schools can improve access to
education and do so efﬁciently (e.g. Bravo et al., 2008),
the route to increased access and equity relates to the
implementation of programs that address the equity
concerns, such as scholarships targeted at students that
cannot afford the costs of private schooling, and programs
to increase the quality of education of public schools.
Overall, our ﬁndings motivate an effort to collect more
detailed data on schools, students, their peers and families
in order to ascertain the exact ways in which studying at a
private high school affects educational achievement and
labour market outcomes, and thus inform the design of
effective educational policies.
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